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ABSTRACT 
The Taiwan issue is a source of possible conflict between Taiwan, the People’s 
Republic of China, and the United States.  While China and Taiwan relations have 
strengthened, the prospect of reunification remains uncertain.  Although China promotes 
peaceful unification of all of its claimed territory, the military’s focus is on Taiwan.  
Conversely, Taiwan authorities rebuke unification, relying on the United States for arms 
and support.     
Throughout the dilemma the United States has played a pivotal role.   Its policy of 
strategic ambiguity created an adverse effect.  U.S. military sales to Taiwan formed 
dependency, requiring China to modernize its military to maintain legitimacy.  Proving 
its commitment of reclaiming Taiwan, Beijing positioned significant weaponry across 
from Taiwan, ensuring tensions remain.  As arms sales continue, the odds of conflict 
grow.  Resolution, whether obtained through peace or violence, generates significantly 
different strategic policy for all parties.  Dialogue between Beijing and Taipei may alter 
the outcome.  As talks progress, the United States must encourage peace, thereby 
avoiding a miscommunication leading to war.    
This thesis focuses on two central questions.  First, how do U.S. arms sales to 
Taiwan affect Taipei’s perception towards reunification?  Second, do U.S. arms sales 
compel China to accelerate its military modernization?   The answers may help to 
develop policies which normalize the relationship between China and Taiwan and 
minimize the role of the United States.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
This thesis explores the effect of U.S. arms sales on resolution of the Taiwan 
question and its impact on China’s military modernization.  While China is increasingly 
influential in global affairs, military advancement remains focused on regaining its 
claimed territory of Taiwan.  This thesis discusses the historical ties between China and 
Taiwan and the role of the United States, and it then proceeds to assess the impact of 
Taipei’s military purchases on China’s military modernization.  
B. IMPORTANCE 
Since 1949, the erratic relations between mainland China and Taiwan have 
garnered the attention of the international community – especially the United States.  
Beijing’s “one China principle” is crystal clear in advocating that Taiwan is an “internal 
affair” that must be handled without foreign interference.  Taiwanese officials, however, 
are reluctant to surrender their democracy and economic prosperity, even through a “one 
China, two systems” structure as proposed by Beijing.  China continues to modernize and 
advance its military capabilities, most of which are positioned toward Taiwan. An ample 
literature discusses Chinese military modernization in the contest of Beijing’s “one China 
principle,” and so the question posed: How does the PLA impact Taiwan’s position on 
reunification? 
Although considered part of China in the last three centuries, Taiwan also has a 
history of colonization.  The conflict regarding Taiwan commenced in 1949 with the 
retreat of Chiang Kai-shek and approximately 2 million Nationalists (the Kuomintang or 
KMT) to the small island, located approximately 100 miles off China’s east coast.  The 
KMT moved its Republic of China (ROC) regime to Taiwan and continued to claim 
sovereignty over all of China.  The Communists rejected the claim as illegitimate and 
declared sovereignty of the mainland and Taiwan under the newly formed People’s 
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Republic of China (PRC).  Although the PRC eventually gained recognition as the de jure 
government of China by most members of the international community, Taiwan has 
continued to refuse to reunify.  
In 1995-96, the PLA conducted a series of missile tests and military exercises in 
reaction to President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to Cornell University and to influence 
upcoming elections.  The United States, acting on the concern expressed in the 1979 
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) regarding stability in the Taiwan Strait, dispatched two 
carrier strike groups into the region.  The next decade witnessed lower tension levels. But 
in 2005, in response to the 2004 adoption of a referendum by the ROC, Beijing adopted 
an anti-succession law validating its intent to oppose Taiwan independence, restating 
China’s legal claim over Taiwan, and expressing its willingness to use military force if 
Taiwan were to assert independence.  To deter future referenda, additional forces were 
positioned across from Taiwan.  The balance of power weighed heavily in the favor of 
China.  Substantial military expenditures continue.  Although a regional arms race could 
prove costly, the PRC remains committed to reunification.  
Why should a possible conflict between China and Taiwan be of concern?  Asia-
Pacific nations remain fearful of what impact a major conflict could have on the regional 
economy and stability.  Added to the mix is the United States, which has played a pivotal 
role in China-Taiwan affairs – a “fly in the ointment” so to speak.  Although declaring a 
“one China policy,” American military and political actions remain contradictory.  To 
Beijing, the United States normalized relations in 1979, supported entry into the United 
Nations in 1971, and cut official ties with ROC, yet it continues to provide arms and 
political advice to Taiwan.  To Taipei, the United States maintains commercial, cultural, 
economic relations, and ambiguous support (by means of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act 
and “six assurances” to Taiwan).  This places each government in a predicament – how to 
proceed forward.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since the conclusion of the Chinese Civil War, Taiwan has remained a factor in 
Chinese foreign policy.  China and Taiwan share vast economic investments and trade, 
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yet politically they differ enormously.  As both pursue stronger diplomatic relations, 
China continues to advance its military capabilities.  With U.S. intervention, coupled with 
Taiwan’s advanced defense assets, a PLA assault could be quickly countered.  PRC 
leadership recognizes that credible military power is essential in preventing additional 
steps toward Taiwan independence.   
Ample literature is available concerning the China-Taiwan relationship, PLA 
modernization, and the possibility of a Straits conflict.  Nevertheless, the focus on today’s 
ever changing environment is essential and a historical review is crucial to understanding 
China’s policies today.   
1. Policies, PLA, and the United States  
a. China Policies 
The international community has limited direct knowledge of the 
motivation behind China’s military modernization.  China is a significant international 
actor, and its lack of transparency creates regional tension and global hesitation.  
Understanding China’s future direction is beneficial to ensure its rapid rise remains 
peaceful.  
Ramon Myers and Jialin Zhang, in their The Struggle across the Taiwan 
Strait, note that China’s policy of reunification has deep roots.  Taiwan is strategically 
important to China, and if separation occurs, PRC officials believe their legitimacy to 
govern will be lost.1  Chinese leaders also see the United States as a reason Taiwan 
nationalism and independence movements remain high.  While Beijing and Taipei are 
today divided over the “one China principle,” the PLA is committed to prohibiting 
succession.  Intimidation tactics may facilitate or impede reunification.   
Taiwan’s presidential elections and the 2000 inaugural address by Chen 
Shui-bian have troubled Chinese leaders.  James Mulvenon points to the controversial 
steps toward independence posed by Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian as a catalyst for 
                                                 
1 Ramon Myers and Jialin Zhang.  The Struggle across the Taiwan Strait: The Divided China 
Problem, Stanford, CA: Hoover Press (2006): 112.  
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China’s coercive strategy.  Chinese leaders reacted to Taiwan’s 1996 presidential 
elections with military exercises, missile tests, and media propaganda.  Taiwan refused to 
back down, the opposite of the intended results from Beijing’s prospective.2  Chinese 
leaders apparently learned that saber rattling could prolong reunification, yet use of force 
could not be ruled out.  During the lead-up to the 2000 presidential elections, the verbal 
attacks came exclusively from Chinese civilian and party channels with military leaders 
relatively silent.3  Was the PLA being removed from China’s reunification strategy?  Not 
likely, as the PLA continues to advance.  Deterrence remains U.S. policy, seeking to 
prohibit any attempt to change the status quo.  Beijing has pressured Washington to 
condemn Chen.  China, though not pleased with possible U.S. intervention, must remain 
committed to reunification, whether through negotiation or through force.    
The 2005 Anti-Secession Law specifically states that “the state shall 
employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty 
and territorial integrity.”4  Beijing has made extremely clear that military build-up 
directed toward the island will continue with the goal of deterring Taiwan from stepping 
closer to independence.5  Chinese President Hu Jintao remarked while meeting visiting 
Swiss Defense Minister in March 2006, "It's our unswerving will and determination to 
oppose 'Taiwan Independence' secessionist forces and their activities and to safeguard the 
peace and stability across the Straits."  He continued, "We will continue to strive for the 
prospect of peaceful reunification, but never tolerate the secession of Taiwan from the 
motherland.  Anyone who moves against historical trend is doomed to failure."6   
Andrew Nathan’s article “China’s Goals in the Taiwan Strait” reviews 
China’s need to gain sovereignty over the island.  As Beijing faces a potential challenge 
                                                 
2 James Mulvenon. “The PLA, Chen Shui-Bian, and the Referenda: The War Dogs that Didn’t Bark.” 
China Leadership Monitor, Vol. 10, 2004: 1. 
3 Ibid., 1. 
4 Anti-Succession Law Adopted by National People’s Congress, People’s Republic of China, 14 March 
2005.  
5 Kenneth Lieberthal. Governing China.  New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, (2004): 329.  
6 “Hu Jintao slashes Taiwan independence attempt,” Xinhua News Agency, 1 March 2006. 
(http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200602/28/eng20060228_246734.html).  
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from the United States and a resurgent Japanese military, the PRC must deny Taiwan to 
its allies.  China is surrounded by multiple, formidable, and potential enemies.  China’s 
Taiwan policy is in part to avoid the unraveling of China’s claim to large parts of 
territory, thereby allowing them to attempt independence.7  The credible use of coercion 
is necessary to the power balance.  PLA advancement, coupled with military action, may 
help deter Taipei’s declaration of independence or U.S. intervention.  The overall goal is 
to reunify Taiwan, reclaim “lost” territories, and ensure regional stability.    
b. PLA Modernization 
The PRC may be expected to utilize both diplomacy and coercive 
strategies to promote reunification.  Crucial to China’s coercive tactics is the 
modernization of the PLA.  Advanced weapon capabilities, modern equipment, and 
superior firepower will help to pressure Taiwan without placing boots on ground.  
Preparing for swift action and the possibility of U.S. intervention, PLA modernization 
will produce success should an attack be warranted.  
The Office of the Secretary of Defense’s “Annual Report on the Military 
Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007” and the PRC White Paper on National 
Defense 2006 are worth noting in this regard.  OSD’s annual report details the PRC’s 
overall strategy and the future of the PLA, but is specifically addressed to the military 
balance in the Taiwan Strait.  China’s force modernization is intended to enhance 
strategic capabilities with regard to military contingencies in the Taiwan Straits as the 
driving factor.8  Understanding Beijing’s military options may allow for the appropriate 
defense for Taiwan.  
Since 1998, the PRC has produced a series of Defense White Papers 
detailing goals and tasks of China’s national defense.  These documents, published every 
two years, are essential in understanding China’s view towards security, sovereignty, and 
Taiwan reunification.  In 2006, China declared that national defense and military 
                                                 
7 Andrew Nathan. “China’s Goals in the Taiwan Strait,” The China Journal, No. 36 (1996): 88.  
8 Office of the Secretary of Defense. “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic 
of China” (2007): 31.  
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modernization are conducted on the basis of economic development, new trends in 
military affairs, and maintaining national security.9  However, containing the “separatist 
forces” within Taiwan remains a challenge.  An attempt by Taiwan to gain independence 
would pose a substantial threat to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.10  While 
continuing to advocate peaceful reunification, the PRC is ready to utilize force should 
conditions warrant.  
How have China’s military forces been transformed?  As the PLA 
modernizes, it seeks to become a high competent military.  Dennis Blasko details the 
PLA’s transformation into a smaller, technologically advanced force while identifying 
long term modernization programs.11  While not concentrated solely on Taiwan, Blasko 
stresses the shift in military priorities toward reunification.  Deterrence of Taiwan 
independence calls for greater emphasis on readiness and training of forces across the 
Strait.12  Although much focus is placed on ground force doctrine and training, his in-
depth look into equipment and weaponry advancements captures the PLA’s intent.  
Bernard Cole provides comparable insight into the modernization of the 
Chinese naval fleet and subsequent maritime strategy.  People’s Liberation Army Navy 
(PLA-N) capabilities must be able to challenge regional powers, Japan, India, Taiwan, 
and the United States, for defense of offshore sovereignty and maritime security. 
Although China has a deep history of naval operations, international attention is drawn to 
the Taiwan Strait.  Chinese maritime doctrine dictates that a strong naval force is required 
to defend sea territorial rights and the mainland.13  
Thomas Kane writes that the development of China’s coercive tactics and 
military modernization is targeted at Taiwan’s policy-makers.14  With its maritime forces 
                                                 
9 PRC White Paper on National Defense, December 2006: 1. 
10 Ibid., 3. 
11 Dennis Blasko.  The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, New 
York, NY: Routledge (2006): 2.  
12 Ibid., 72.  
13 Bernard Cole. The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the 21st Century, Annapolis, MD: 
Naval Institute Press (2001): 9.  
14 Thomas Kane. Chinese Grand Strategy and Maritime Power, Portland, OR: Frank Cass (2002): 70. 
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in the vicinity of Taiwan, China’s superior fleet can generate alarm among citizens and 
opposition forces.  A formidable, efficient navy could deter possible intervention should a 
Straits crisis occur.15  
China also needs a swift, mobile air force.  John Lewis and Xue Litai 
review previous attempts and current programs for developing air superiority.  A modern 
air force may deter Taiwan from independence and U.S. intervention.  Deng Xiaoping 
was convinced that the PLA Air Force (PLA-AF) would play a more significant role in 
future conflicts.16  Although early failures occurred, China reshaped its air force goals as 
a consequence the 1991 Gulf War.  A change in structure and strategy was necessary 
because, without air power, the army and navy would suffer humiliating defeats should 
conflict arise.  A strong and credible air force would help to deter separation movements 
and attacks against Chinese security interests.  
Part of modernizing a vast military is funding.  China’s defense industry 
has experienced a recent overhaul, yet problems with military production exist.  
Technology remains a troubling issue, especially with the U.S. and European Union arms 
embargo.  Without a doubt China is gaining and developing advanced assets.  Projections 
of PRC defense expenditures are controversial, yet estimates based on Beijing’s white 
papers, International Institute of Strategic Studies, and Office of the Secretary of Defense 
documents conclude that China is spending record amounts to develop one of the world’s 
largest military forces.  
c. U.S.  Intervention 
The U.S. priority on regional stability is sensitive to Beijing’s potential 
use of force in pursuit of reunification.  Taiwan plays a significant role in China-U.S. 
affairs.  How can the United States affect the PLA’s impact on reunification?  Analysts’ 
reactions are mixed.  Many believe that Washington must address the shift in the region 
towards China.  They argue that Washington’s longstanding policy of “strategic 
                                                 
15 Thomas Kane. Chinese Grand Strategy and Maritime Power, Portland, OR: Frank Cass (2002): 71. 
16 John Lewis and Xue Litai. “China’s Search for a Modern Air Force,” International Security  
24 (1999): 70. 
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ambiguity” regarding Taiwan must be clarified.  Others disagree, believing that keeping 
the status quo through ambiguity is the only effective deterrent.  Still others contend that 
China and Taiwan are bound for war and U.S. intervention is inevitable.   
John Copper paints a more pessimistic picture of a China-Taiwan future.  
Political differences will feed an escalation of conflict between the United States and 
China over Taiwan.  Since 1988, China’s economic success has allowed increased 
military spending, seriously threatening Taiwan.17  China’s military advancement is not 
designed to rival that of the United States, but to regain control over lost territories.  
Taiwan depends upon the United States to challenge and contain China.  Although 
previous Chinese intimidation was deemed ineffective, modernizing the PLA could shift 
the regional power balance to China.   
The title of Michael O’Hanlon’s article bluntly declares his view – “China 
Cannot Conquer Taiwan.”  He writes that Washington should not abandon its policy of 
strategic ambiguity and of deterring China from attempting a military invasion.18  As the 
PLA modernizes, Taiwan itself procures more U.S. defense weaponry.  Military coercion 
remains more likely than an invasion, as the cost to Beijing would be drastically lower 
and the prospect of success significantly higher.19  U.S. intervention would be crucial, 
and dedicated defense planning strictly for Taiwan is therefore warranted.  To the extent 
that Taipei will continue an independence push, Taiwan must gain defensive weapons.  
With a majority of China’s weapons aimed across the Strait, Taiwan’s preparation 
coupled with U.S. intervention could withstand attacks from the PLA.   
Roger Cliff and David Shlapak’s RAND report, published in 2007, depicts 
the likely courses of action and consequences should China and Taiwan go to war.  
Pathways by which Taiwan’s status might be resolved are strongly conditioned by what 
                                                 
17 John Copper. Playing with Fire: The Looming War with China over Taiwan, Westport, CT: Praeger 
International (2006): 227.  
18 Michael O’Hanlon. “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” International Security 25 (2000): 53.
      19 Ibid.  
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the resolution is and how it comes about.20 As China’s power and military capabilities 
grow, the possibility of Beijing attempting to bring about reunification through force 
increases.21  Continuous arms sales to Taiwan increase defensive capabilities and the 
odds of conflict.  The United States remains a factor not only through equipment sales, 
but through diplomacy and mediation.  All outcomes point to a significantly different 
strategic policy and military planning for the United States.  Ultimately, a defeat of PLA 
forces will become a daunting task.  
The literature provides a glimpse into the dilemmas in China and Taiwan 
relations.  As Taiwan’s presidential elections approach, literature on the subject will 
grow.  Chinese military modernization and weapons positioned across from Taiwan will 
ensure that tensions remain.  Coercion has proven ineffective in the past, yet PLA 
advancement continues with Beijing’s “one China principle” at the forefront.  Both China 
and Taiwan remain steadfast in their political positions, creating tensions and potential 
conflict.  
The literature concerning PLA modernization is comprehensive and 
allows for multiple questions.  First, how do U.S. arms sales to Taiwan impact 
reunification?  Second, do continued arms sales to Taipei spur Chinese military 
modernization? Third, what is the future state of affairs for China, Taiwan, and the 
United States?  Answering these questions can help develop policies to normalize the 
relationship between China and Taiwan and minimize the role of the United States.   
  
 
                                                 
20 Roger Cliff and David Shlapak. U.S.-China Relations after Resolution of Taiwan’s Status, 
Arlington, VA: RAND (2007): 1.  
21 Ibid., 7.  
 10
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II. HISTORICAL SETTING 
A. THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) EMERGES 
In the late 1920s the newly formed Republic of China (ROC) was in turmoil.  
Japanese encroachment coupled with strict warlord control devastated the nation.  The 
Nationalist Party (KMT), led by Chiang Kai-shek, sought to reunite and stabilize the 
country.  Founded in July 1921, the Communist Party of China (CPC) combined forces 
with the Nationalists to oust the aggressors.  The partnership was temporary.  In 1927, 
Chiang turned on his Communist allies, nearly wiping them out and forcing remnant 
forces to seek refuge in the countryside, where Mao Zedong’s Soviet Republic was set 
up.22  In this way the struggle for power in China began between the Nationalists and the 
Communists.23  
The eruption of full scale war with Japan in the summer of 1937 ended any 
chance that Chiang Kai-shek had of creating a strong and centralized nation-state.24  To 
expel the invaders, the bitter opponents were again united.  The termination of World 
War II removed Japan from the mainland and recognized China as a major power.  The 
Nationalists and Communists moved quickly to gain land, resources, and power.  The 
once powerful allies were engaged in a brutal competition.   
The nation was thrust back into its bitter civil war.  In 1947, the Communists 
launched a major counteroffensive.  The new assault penetrated the core areas of the 
KMT state, hitting targets key to the control of China, and awoke the world to the 
 
 
                                                 
22 Lawrence R. Sullivan. Historical Dictionary of the People’s Republic of China, Lanham, MD: The 
Scarecrow Press (2007): 2.  
23 Robert L. Worden. China: A Country Study, Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army (1987): 
33.  
24 Jonathan D. Spence. The Search for Modern China. New York, NY: W.W. Norton (1990): 437.  
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 possibility of the Communists governing China.25  The Communists were well 
established in rural areas and shifted focus to seizing of major cities.  The battles 
continued, some with little resistance, on Nationalists strongholds.   
The tide turned in favor of the Communists.  Mao shifted to the goal of 
eliminating Chiang and the KMT.  The Americans pledged economic assistance to the 
Nationalists with hopes of defeating the up-and-coming Communist Party, whose victory 
would gain Moscow an ally in the neighboring Soviet Union.  Facing successive defeats 
and realizing that American support was too late; the Nationalists were forced to flee to 
Taiwan.  Chiang Kai-shek and approximately two million Nationalists moved the 
Republic of China to Taiwan with hopes of re-conquering the mainland from the island.   
On 1 October 1949, after 28 years of struggle, Chairman Mao Zedong formally 
announced the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  The civil war, 
though not officially concluded, split China.  The Communists maintained the People’s 
Republic of China on the mainland, and the Nationalist in the Republic of China, on 
Taiwan.  Unwavering, the Nationalists on Taiwan remained defiant transforming into a 
self-sustaining island; thus beginning debate over Taiwan’s rightful owners.   
B. PRC – ROC CROSS STRAIT RELATIONS 
The conclusion of the civil war did not end the fighting between China and 
Taiwan.  Each government claimed sovereignty over the mainland and sought 
international recognition.  As the mainland transitioned to socialism, Taipei pushed to 
gain powerful allies.  Initially, after the onset of the Korean War in June 1950, the United 
States backed Taipei’s fight against the Communists. With the Cold War ongoing, having 
a formable ally in close proximity to the Soviet Union was crucial.  In 1979 the United 
States formally recognizing the PRC. According to Washington’s “one China policy,” it 
“acknowledged” that the PRC is the sole legal government of China and Taiwan is a part 
of China, thus reducing relations to an “unofficial” basis with the ROC.   
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The two sides maintained a deep divide and entered into a vicious power struggle 
that precluded any type of cooperation.  The U.S. recognition of China only deepened the 
divide between China and Taiwan.  Beijing pressed its “one China principle,” while 
Taipei retained its ban on all trade, travel, and social ties with the mainland.  Beijing 
focused on developing a strong industrial base and opening its economy to the world, as 
Taipei shifted from agriculture to advanced industries, both attempting to meet global 
demand.  
Although each side attempted to gain an advantage over the other, significant 
efforts were eventually made to create a better climate for relations and possibly 
reunification.26  After normalizing relations with Washington, Beijing launched its 
“peaceful unification” policy toward Taipei, offering steps to open trade and travel ties 
across the Taiwan Strait.  In 1979, Beijing established “special economic zones” to 
promote closer cross strait economic relations.  In 1987, Taipei relaxed its ban on trade 
and travel to the mainland, as both sides sought to expand economic links. 
Simultaneously, Taipei’s rapid shift to democratic rule after 1987 allowed 
Taiwan’s people to speak.  Though the new president, Lee Teng-hui, began to insist on 
Taiwan’s sovereignty, he also encouraged the people to “return to their roots.”27  
1. Trade Link 
Taiwan's economy is now strongly linked to China’s.  Taiwan is the world’s 
leading computer parts supplier and among the top five in textile exports, with majority 
of product fabrication occurring in mainland China. Economic integration is essential in 
providing additional business opportunities, growth, and progress.28  In 2007 Beijing 
made significant efforts to enhance cooperation and strengthen cross-Strait trade ties.  
Throughout the year China’s Commerce Ministry removed multiple tariffs on Taiwan 
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agricultural products supporting further trade in an important sector.  On 19 January 
2008, Commerce Minister Chen declared, “Chinese mainland will effectively push 
forward direct trade with Taiwan and construct a cooperative trade mechanism between 
the two sides on the basis of a "one China" policy.”29  
Currently, the mainland is Taiwan’s most important export market.   Surpassing 
the United States, China accounted for over 27 percent of Taiwan's total trade and almost 
40 percent of Taiwan's exports were being purchased by China.30  During the first 11 
months of 2007 the Chinese mainland documented a $70 billion trade deficit with exports 
to Taiwan reaching $21.18 billion and imports from the island reaching $91.61 billion.31  
According to custom figures, trade volume between Taiwan and the mainland was up 
15.4 percent to US$124.48 billion in 2007.32  
Taiwan also has substantial investment in the mainland.  Taiwan official statistics 
indicate that Taiwan firms invested about $55 billion in China through 2006, over half of 
Taiwan's direct foreign investment.33  The CCP’s official newspaper People’s Daily 
reported an increase of 1474 cases of new investments by Taiwan businesses in the 
mainland, up 21 percent from the previous year.34  A significant amount of investment 
appeared in the China’s central and western regions.  Since figures first began in 1988, 
Taiwan-funded projects accounted for $45.33 billion of direct investments from 
Taiwan.35  
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2. Social Links 
After the establishment of the PRC, direct links in transportation, trade, and mail 
between both sides of Straits were suspended.  Now, however, an estimated one million 
Taiwanese work on the mainland and over two million families remaining from the 
conclusion of the Chinese Civil War.  After 30 years of separation, the National People's 
Congress (NPC) initiated a proposal for "starting postal, air and shipping services across 
the Straits," and "developing trade, supplying each other's needs and conducting 
economic exchanges."36  The proposal, calling for what became known as the "three 
direct links," and Taipei’s lifting of its ban on travel to the mainland in 1987 facilitated 
relations between families allowing communication, visits, and further restoration of 
cultural connections. 
In 1989, postal services were between China & Taiwan was established through 
Hong Kong.  Four years later the mainland-based Association for Relations across the 
Taiwan Straits (ARATS) and the Taiwan-based Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) 
signed an agreement formalizing postal operations across the straits.37  Although mail 
services were authorized, restrictions have limited the scope of postal operations.  
Telegraph and telephone services opened between China and Taiwan, via Hong 
Kong, in 1989.  China Telecom and Taiwan Chunghwa Telecom collaborated to provide 
telephone, mobile, & video services.  Today, communication services account for a 
substantial share of investment and business opportunity.  
Indirect air services began in 1995, with air routes passing through Macao & 
Hong Kong.  Since, Taiwan airlines have opened administrative & maintenance offices in 
China.  In 2003, Beijing allowed direct flights for Taiwan’s business people in an attempt 
to foster mainland investment.  Six Taiwan airlines were approved to commute between 
Taipei & Shanghai; the first time in 50 years Taiwan operated planes landed on a 
mainland airport by normal approach.  
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Taiwan authorities remain a roadblock in the implementation of the “three direct 
links” proposal.  President Chen Shui-bian points to the negative impact of direct air and 
sea links on Taiwan; especially island security and the economy.  A report in the Beijing 
newspaper China Daily declares, “Direct transportation would benefit the mainland's 
united front tactics against Taiwan, and obstruct the island's efforts to win over 
international opinion.”  It continues, “Links benefit the mainland's air and sea penetration 
into Taiwan endangering the island's air, maritime, and land security.”38  
The Anti-Succession Law passed in 2005, re-emphasized Beijing’s desire to 
promote cross-Straits relations.  It “encourages and facilitates economic exchanges and 
cooperation, realization of direct links of trade, mail and air and shipping services, and 
brings closer economic ties between the two sides of the Straits.”  The ability to advance 
relations is said to be beneficial to regional stability.  Although political differences 
remain, the past twenty years have witnessed significant economic and cultural 
exchanges.   
C. ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 
For decades the United States has played a pivotal role in Chinese affairs.  During 
World War II, it embarked in late 1941 on a program of massive military and financial 
aid to the hard pressed Nationalist government.39  As the war continued, the United 
States revised and repealed treaties in hopes of China remaining an ally against the 
Japanese.  
The defeat of Japan did not halt hostilities between the Nationalists and 
Communists.  To stop the spread of communism the United States provided the 
Nationalists government economic aid and military support.  This did little to slow the 
Communists.  In defeat, the Nationalists fled the mainland for Taiwan.  
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On 5 January 1950, President Truman made a decision regarding China and 
Taiwan.  “The United States Government will not provide military aid or advice to 
Chinese forces on Taiwan.”  He continued, “The United States has no intention of 
utilizing its armed forces to interfere in present conflict in China.”40  Truman’s stance 
shifted six months later with outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula.  Realizing 
Communist control could jeopardize American security interests Washington was 
inclined to keep Taiwan out of Communist hands.41  Unwillingness to intervene in 
support of a recognized ally in Taiwan would mean U.S. alliances would be questioned 
everywhere.42  President Truman immediately ordered Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan 
Straits as deterrence.  Positioned to ensure further conflict between the PRC and ROC, 
Beijing viewed the United States siding with the Nationalists.  
As peace talks progressed on the Korean peninsula, the PRC and ROC mobilized 
forces.  The former would liberate and reunify Taiwan; the latter planned attacks to 
regain control.  Twice—in 1954-1955 and again from August to October 1958, the PRC 
shelled Quemoy and Matsu, pushing President Eisenhower to dispatch naval forces into 
the Strait.  American naval and air forces would aid in Taiwan’s self defense.  In each 
case the PRC eventually ceased its attacks, but not its policy of “liberation.”  
In the mid-1970s the United States planned military reductions in the Asia-Pacific 
region.  Troops, equipment, and services were removed from Taiwan.  The U.S.-Taiwan 
relationship was seemingly shattered with President Nixon’s visit to China.  In an 
unprecedented move, Nixon sought strategic relations with the communist country the 
United States previously denounced.  In February 1972, the “Shanghai Communiqué” 
was published.  Each nation agreed to progress toward the normalization of relations and 
reduce the possibility of international conflict, yet the question of Taiwan’s status 
remained ambiguous.  Beijing reaffirmed its position stating, “The Government of the 
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People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province 
of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is 
China's internal affair and external intervention is unwarranted. The United States only 
“acknowledged” the position “that there is one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.”  
It added that it retains an interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan.43  
The next few years witnessed little progress.  The Carter Administration intended 
to expand the geopolitical alignment with Beijing that Nixon created and sought to 
establish diplomatic relations.44  Beijing’s one demand was for Washington to end ties 
with Taipei.  On 15 December 1979, Beijing and Washington released a joint 
communiqué establishing diplomatic relations as of 1 January 1979.  Washington agreed 
to terminate formal diplomatic relations and the mutual defense treaty with the 
Nationalist government and to withdraw remaining U.S. forces from the island.45  
Nevertheless, the American position regarding Beijing’s “one China principle” remained 
ambiguous.  China’s position remained “both nations recognized that “there is one China 
and Taiwan is part of China.”  The United States chose only to “acknowledge”--not 
specifically to “recognize”--the “one China principle,” and insisted it would “maintain 
commercial and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.”46  Again, Taiwan’s 
status remained unresolved. 
Although the United States made pledges to Beijing regarding Taiwan, it failed to 
fully abide by the normalization communiqué.  The U.S. did begin troop withdrawal, yet 
military support continued.  But the Carter Administration also moved to create a legal 
foundation for such ties and for continued arms sales.  Public Law 96-8, also known as 
the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), was signed into law in May 1979.  The act supported 
economic aid, continued arms sales to Taiwan, and implied American military assistance 
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should coercion be directed to Taiwan.  This was a major shock to Beijing.  The TRA, 
especially arms sales, was considered to be “unilaterally taking back much of what the 
United States had agreed to give China on the Taiwan issue.”47  
Newly elected, after campaigning to re-recognize Taipei, President Reagan 
eventually worked to meet Beijing’s demands with respect to Taiwan arms sales.48  In 
August 1982, Beijing and Washington published a third joint communiqué, reaffirming 
previous communiqués and specifically addressing arms sales to Taiwan.  The United 
States stated “that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to 
Taiwan, arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed previous levels supplied, and it intends 
gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan.”49  At the same time, the Reagan 
Administration privately extended, via presidential letter to Taipei, on six points 
governing the conduct of United States-Taiwan relations.  Known as the “six assurances,” 
Washington agreed not to set a date for terminating arms sales, would not deviate from 
the TRA, and would not consult with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan.   
The Chinese student movement and the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 
placed strain on Beijing-Washington relations.  President George H. W. Bush pressured 
China to better human rights, yet the Administration maintained diplomatic and economic 
relations with China.  At the same time, American arms sales to Taiwan continued.  
Taiwan’s future depended on making sure the PLA did not grow so much more powerful 
than Taiwan’s armed forces that it would be compelled to negotiate with China.50   
The U.S.-PRC-Taiwan relationship remained unchanged until the mid-1990s.  
The defense of Taiwan remained a concern.  President Clinton entered the White House 
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with past personal ties to Taiwan and put more emphasis on China’s human rights abuses.  
Clinton’s approach toward China appeared tough.  His resolve was tested in 1995-96 with 
two crises over Taiwan.   
The Clinton Administration was forced to act when the PRC, enraged at 
Washington’s granting Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui’s a visa to visit to the United 
States, launched a series of military exercises opposite Taiwan.  Missile tests and firing 
exercises from August 1995 to March 1996 were intended to underscore to Washington 
its resolve regarding Taiwan independence and to intimidate Taiwan’s electorate during 
the December 1995 National Assembly and March 1996 presidential elections.  President 
Clinton dispatched first one, and later, two aircraft carrier strike groups to the region to 
indicate to Beijing that the United States was committed to aid Taiwan and deter Chinese 
aggression.   
In 2001, President George W Bush rattled Beijing by stating he would “whatever 
it took to help Taiwan defend herself" in the event of attack by China.51  The Bush 
administration quickly recanted, reassuring both sides of the straits.  Since then, to 
Beijing it has reiterated the longstanding American “one China policy”; to Taipei, it has 
implied a readiness to maintain as the status quo.  Beijing remains opposed to the U.S. 
position, believing the United States misleads Taiwan into pressing for independence.  
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu Jianchao stated “The United States should refrain 
from sending any wrong signals to the separatists and make concerted efforts with China 
to maintain peace and stability.”52  Beijing continues to strive for peaceful reunification 
and pins its hopes on Chen’s opposition.  Yet it must be somewhat skeptical, as the years 
have shown Taiwan, with U.S. involvement, has continued to assert its status as a 
sovereign country, therefore rejecting reunification.53   
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Two communiqués recognized the PRC as the legitimate government of China; 
the TRA and “Six Assurances” guarantee security for Taiwan.  The balancing of dual 
deterrence—implying a U.S. readiness to defend Taiwan to Beijing while not explicitly 
affirming it to Taipei--has become regarded as “strategic ambiguity.”  This remains the 
basis of U.S. policy and is credited for facilitating U.S.-China relations, preserving U.S.-
Taiwan contacts, and deterring cross-Strait hostilities.54   
Today the United States remains an integral factor in China-Taiwan affairs.  The 
United States is China’s top trading partner, accounting for $262 billion in 2006, a 24 
percent increase from the previous year.55  Subsequently the United States is Taiwan’s 
third largest trading partner amounting to $62 billion, a rise of 7.6 percent from 2005.56  
Both economies have a substantial impact on U.S. policies and vice versa.  Dialogue 
between China, Taiwan, and the United States ensures national interest and may avoid a 
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III. “ONE CHINA” POLICY 
A. TAIWAN IN CHINA’S GRAND STRATEGY 
After the establishment of the PRC, China’s policy towards Taiwan was based on 
forceful “liberation” of the island.  Mao Zedong possessed a strong desire to reclaim 
Taiwan and eliminate Nationalists opposition.  Throughout the 1950s Chinese artillery 
shelled the ROC islands of Quemoy and Matsu, testing the Nationalist’s determination to 
retain control of them.  Beijing believed that the civil war would not end until 
reunification occurred.  Initially, in 1950, Chinese forces prepared for an invasion of 
Taiwan to topple the ROC government, yet U.S. intervention halted the preparations.57    
Once the Korean War began, the United States, fearing reunification would 
expand communism, pledged support to the ROC.  China’s policy changed slightly.  The 
PRC supplemented its official proposals for negotiation with a variety of political actions 
aimed at stimulating interesting them and weakening support for the ROC in Taiwan and 
abroad, including appeals to KMT leaders on Taiwan, propaganda broadcasts, infiltration 
of agents, and organizational work among overseas Chinese.58  In October 1958 Defense 
Minister Peng Dehuai called on Taipei to enter into negotiations for a peaceful solution of 
the Taiwan problem.59  Up to 1979, negotiations stalled, but Taiwan remained central to 
China’s grand strategy. 
With the United States officially recognizing the PRC, Beijing announced a 
policy of peaceful reunification.  On 1 January 1979, China’s National People’s Congress 
(NPC) first peaceful message was submitted to Taiwan.  The message was directed to the 
island’s population, not necessarily the ROC leadership.  It called on citizens to “end the 
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disunity” and press Taiwan authorities for reunification ensuring “the survival, growth, 
and prosperity of the motherland.”60  Military shelling and confrontation ended, though 
Beijing would not give up its nationalistic ambition to bring Taiwan under its control.61  
In 1981, Beijing announced a nine point proposal aimed at resolving the Taiwan 
question.  The proposal allowed Taiwan, after reunification, to “enjoy a high degree of 
autonomy as a special administrative region, retain its armed forces, and gain subsides.”62  
It also called for the establishment of mail, air, and shipping services providing people to 
people contacts, suspended since 1949.  
In addition, Deng Xiaoping promulgated the “one country, two systems” concept 
in hopes of finalizing reunification.  Although a majority of the international community 
accepted Beijing’s “one China principle,” Taiwan officials defied unification.  China 
would not relent in its policy to reclaim Taiwan.  China’s best chance of reunification 
would occur through a successful, modernized and booming economy, with expanding 
trade and a market full of business opportunities.63  The longer reunification is delayed; 
Taiwan authorities and citizens are less likely to accept it.  
In January 1995, Jiang Zemin re-addressed the Taiwan issue in a speech titled 
“Continue to Promote the Reunification of the Motherland.”  He began by emphasizing 
Beijing’s position since 1981 that “after Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland, its 
social and economic systems will not change, nor will its way of life and its non-
governmental relations with foreign countries, which means foreign investments in 
Taiwan and the non-governmental exchanges between Taiwan and other countries will 
not be affected.”64  He continued with an eight-point proposal further promoting 
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reunification, cross strait economic exchanges, and interaction between both sides’ 
leaders.  The essence of his eight point proposal was an invitation to Taiwan to come to 
the negotiating table to discuss reunification on an “equal footing” under the “one China” 
principle.”65 
Today, Taiwan is not the central focus of China’s foreign policy, though Chinese 
leadership realizes the great economic potential embedded in a reunified Taiwan.  Its 
economic and technical developments enhance China’s modernization, yet previous 
presidential elections, independence referenda, and continued arms sales to Taiwan 
agitate Beijing officials.  Beijing continues to seek a peaceful outcome to the Taiwan 
issue, yet the capacity to utilize force for unification has strengthened.  The 1995-96 
Taiwan Strait Crisis and 2005 Anti-Succession Law are indicators that military force will 
be employed should conditions warrant.  China’s continued military modernization and 
the balance of military forces in the Taiwan Strait may require Taiwan authorities to 
reconsider reunification and future independence referenda.  PRC leadership must 
determine if excessive harassment and intimidation could lead to a reversal of 
international policies therefore containing vice engaging China.   
Beijing today has a dilemma with respect to Taiwan.  Beijing strives for peaceful 
reunification and pins its hopes on Chen’s opposition, yet it must remain skeptical that 
Taiwan, with United States involvement, may not compromise its autonomous status and 
its booming economy, therefore rejecting reunification.66  The need for reunification is 
not only historical, but a reinforcement of government legitimacy.  Mao and Deng 
regarded Taiwan’s independence as unacceptable and should never be considered by 
future PRC presidents.  The loss of Taiwan would not only crush Chinese spirit and 
morale, but disgrace China.  Beijing would much rather allow for a “one country, two 
systems” approach or possibly forgo economic ties with the United States to ensure 
Taiwan remains Chinese territory.   
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B. CORNELL UNIVERSITY WELCOMES PRESIDENT LEE 
In early 1995 Lee Teng-hui was extended an invitation to deliver a speech at 
Cornell University’s alumni assembly. Although Lee had made several “private” visits to 
regional nations with the intention of promoting Taiwan’s international position, a trip to 
the United States would be a breakthrough.  Taiwan lobbyists, Cornell Alumni, and 
media outlets supporting Lee encouraged the State Department to grant his visa.  Support 
of Lee continued as did the denial of visa requests by the Clinton State Department.   
On 2 May 1995 the House of Representatives conceded voting 396 to 0 in favor 
of granting a visa to President Lee Teng-hui. The Senate followed with a vote of 97 to 1.  
The non-binding resolution called on President Clinton to act.  John Ohta, a State 
Department spokesman, said the Administration was not rethinking its position, adding 
that allowing him to visit "would have serious consequences for United States foreign 
policy." He said that because Lee was ROC president, China would not act kindly if the 
United States granted him a visa "because a visit by a person his title, whether or not the 
visit were termed private, would unavoidably be seen by the People's Republic of China 
as removing an essential element of unofficiality in the U.S.-Taiwan relationship.”67   
Clinton officials repeatedly stressed the United States had not changed its policy 
stance toward China or Taiwan.  Never less, China’s Foreign Ministry protested saying 
that admitting Lee for either an official or private visit would have "serious 
consequences."68  On 22 May 1995, President Clinton reversed a 16-year ban on United 
States visits by high ranking ROC officials by granting President Lee Teng-hui a 
“private” visit to Cornell.69  Beijing was incensed.   
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The Chinese government issued a strong protest following Clinton’s decision.   "If 
the United States clings to its erroneous decision it will inevitably cause severe damage to 
Sino-U.S. relations.  For that it should bear all the consequences," a Foreign Ministry 
statement said.70  PRC officials proclaimed that the United States violated the principles 
of the three communiqués by allowing the concept of “two Chinas” or “one China, one 
Taiwan."   
United States Ambassador to China Stapleton Roy was quickly summoned.  The 
Foreign Ministry demanded that the United States reverse its visa decision and that 
President Clinton should reaffirm its policy to China.  U.S.-China diplomatic visits were 
cancelled and economic ties strained, but President Lee’s visit to Cornell would have 
significant consequences for Taiwan.  
C. CHINA’S MISSILE TEST 
1. 1995-1996 Straits Crisis 
President Lee’s visit to Cornell University generated outrage in Beijing.  The 
United States allowance of an ROC official visit strained an already complicated 
relationship.  China recalled its ambassador to the United States and stalled in approving 
Stapleton Roy’s successor.  Though much resentment was vented toward the United 
States, Beijing held great disdain and displeasure regarding Taiwan.  Beijing officials 
suspended the semi-official contacts developed with Taipei and in a dramatic turn 
engaged in various displays of military power.71  It was declared that a series of missiles 
would be launched off the coast of Taiwan; commercial air and sea vessels were warned 
to remain clear of the test area.  Beijing meant to generate fear and prove a point.  
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On 21 July 1995 the Second Artillery Corps of the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) began firing surface to surface ballistic missiles.     For three days two DF-15, also 
known as CSS-6, ballistic missiles were direct to sea positions landing within 100 miles 
of Taipei.  
Three weeks later the PLA conducted another missile test in close proximity to 
Taipei.  This test, meant to intimidate Taiwan, was performed by units from Second 
Artillery Corps and the PLA Navy (PLA-N) and Air Force (PLA-AF). The exercises 
deployed missiles, navy vessels, including JIANGHU-class destroyers, live artillery 
shells, ship-to-ship and ship-to-air missiles, and navy fighter planes, and firing of various 
air-to-air missiles.72  
Additional test and exercises occurred during October and November.  On 
Dongshan Island, south of Taiwan, the PLA executed an amphibious assault exercise.  
The People’s Armed Police, along with recently acquired weaponry and equipment, were 
incorporated into the exercise.  PLA leaders intended to send a message and demonstrate 
an invasion was possible.  
The previous exercises had significant impact on Taiwan’s economy.  Should the 
PLA-N board, inspect, and/or turn away a few inbound commercial ships it would 
devastate Taiwan by depriving the island of essential imports and exports.73  At the time 
an estimated 99 per cent of Taiwan's international trade goes by sea (75 percent via the 
ports of Keelung and Kaohsiung), while 82 per cent of its GNP is derived from 
international trade.65 Moreover, 100 per cent of Taiwan's crude oil is imported; a 
supertanker docks in Kaohsiung every three days.  Although Taiwan officials urged 
people to remain calm and sought to play down the threat, Beijing’s psychological 
warfare had considerable impact on Taiwan’s citizens.74 
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Cross straits tensions elevated again in March 1996 with Taiwan’s upcoming 
presidential elections.  The elections were viewed as another step toward independence 
and the PRC would not let that occur.  The campaigning would continue.  
Showing its displeasure, China announced that the PLA would conduct another 
series of missile tests off the shores of Taiwan.  On 8 March 1996, the Second Artillery 
Corps fired three surface to surface missiles.  The most provocative was launching 
unarmed ballistic missiles at targets outside the island’s ports.75  Two hit targets in the 
waters west of Kaohsiung, Taiwan’s largest port; one hit west of Keelung, a port near 
Taipei.76  The previous missile testing did not deter Taiwan as hoped, but with improved 
accuracy this sequence would intensify the intimidation level.  
Over the next two weeks the PLA continued live fire exercises, warning 
commercial traffic to maneuver away from the area.  As election day approached, PLA 
movements around Taiwan increased.  A sequence of joint operations occurred consisting 
of multiple amphibious assault exercises and maritime maneuvers.  This display of force 
was much more aggressive involving 150,000 troops, three hundred planes, five guided-
missile destroyers and frigates, four submarines, and a number of jet fighters.77   
With shipping redirected and missiles landing in critical sea lanes of 
communication, Beijing’s intention of disrupting Taiwan trade succeeded.  While the 
PLA frightened Taiwan’s citizens an unexpected outcome occurred.  Cargo ships 
containing oil inbound to Japan and South Korea were either redirected or suspended.  
The deficiency of essential commodities drew concern from the international community.  
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2. Response 
a. United States 
Throughout 1995 official exchanges between the United States and China 
did not lessen PLA activity.  Beijing’s exercises, while meant to show displeasure for 
President Lee’s visit to Cornell, appeared indirectly intended to discourage U.S. 
interference.  Chinese officials felt Americans would not allow Clinton and Congress to 
confront China over Taiwan.  By the end of 1995, the Clinton administration took a 
significant step in counteracting the Chinese campaign of threats and intimidation against 
Taiwan.78  In December the U.S.S. Nimitz strike group was ordered into the region.  The 
Nimitz led a force of five naval vessels through the Taiwan Straits for the first time since 
the 1950s.  
Within three months the United States again responded to PLA operations 
off the coast of Taiwan.  Beijing’s actions were twofold: influence Taiwan’s elections 
and discourage the United States from further intervention by demonstrating China’s 
superior military capability.  Clinton quickly gathered his foreign policy team.  Everyone 
at the meeting agreed that the United States should counteract China with a show of 
force, one that would reassure both Taiwan and American allies in Asia.79  President 
Clinton would order two aircraft carriers into the region.  The sending of two aircraft 
carriers to the crisis area was much more significant and provocative.80  
The U.S.S. Independence strike group, stationed in Yokosuka, Japan and 
conducting routine operations near Manila, was directed to Taiwan.  Accompanying 
Independence were the guided missile cruiser Bunker Hill, the destroyers O’Brien and 
Hewitt, the frigate McCluskey, two submarines Columbus and Bremerton, one 
replenishment ship, and over 70 aircraft.  The U.S.S. Nimitz strike group, operating in the 
Mediterranean, was diverted to assist Independence off Taiwan’s coast.  Nimitz brought 
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additional warships and substantial firepower.  The Nimitz strike group consisted of the 
guided missile cruiser Port Royal, the destroyers Callaghan and Oldendorf, the frigate 
Ford, one submarine the Portsmouth, two replenishment ships, and over 100 aircraft.  
The largest fleet had been assembled in the Pacific for the first time in decades.  Defense 
Secretary William J. Perry stated, “Beijing should know, and this {U.S. fleet} will 
remind them, that while they are a great military power, the strongest, the premier 
military power in the Western Pacific is the United States."81  
No doubt existed to Washington’s intentions--aggression toward Taiwan 
would not be tolerated.  Although Washington supported Taiwan’s democracy, it could 
not encourage independence.  Maintaining a policy of “strategic ambiguity” assured both 
regimes pursued a peaceful outcome to the sixty-year dispute.  
b. Taiwan 
Missile firings rattled citizens, disrupted the economy, and shook up the 
presidential debate, yet Taiwan’s response was mixed.  Taiwan was definitely alarmed 
and the government did not help matters.  
Government officials provoked Beijing.  In anticipation of the tests, 
defense officials in Taipei put the military on high alert status, creating an atmosphere of 
war in and around Taiwan.82  Defense officials warned of retaliation.  Defense Minister 
Chiang Chung-ling, as quoted by a member of parliament, stated, "If any of the missiles 
land within our 12-nautical-mile territorial waters, we will strike back immediately."83  
The rhetoric increased tensions.  
Lee remained calm until the initial salvos were launched.  After missiles 
landed in nearby waters, President Lee Teng-hui told the national assembly: "We should 
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restudy the question of nuclear weapons from a long-term point of view."84  In another 
meeting, Lee sneered at Beijing, saying China was conducting the exercise because "it is 
afraid of Taiwan's first democratic presidential elections and the impact on the Chinese 
people."85   
Lee’s intentions were to distort the view of Beijing by attacking PRC 
leaders and gain increased support for continued opposition.  President Lee did have 
supporters, but with the elections fast approaching he had many critics.  Many new 
candidates jumped into the debate.  A possible attack on Taiwan would take center stage 
and engulf the island.  Each party placed a spin on the issue, further confusing and 
frightening citizens.  Beijing’s exercises created internal turmoil in Taiwan.   
China intended to intimidate the Taiwanese population.  Taiwan leaders 
tried to reassure citizens and not to overreact.  Media and presidential debates did not 
help the cause.  Individuals flooded banks, converting their currency to the U.S. dollar.  
Visa applications skyrocketed as people prepared to leave the island.   
It did create solidarity in a majority of Taiwanese citizens.  Lee supporters 
justified his stance. Beijing was a tyranny seeking to control the island.  Parris H. Chang, 
a legislative leader of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party added, "Unless 
they are going to invade us before the balloting takes place we are casting a vote.  We are 
institutionalizing our independence and the PRC is going to have to accept this reality."86   
Taiwan officials made sure the United States was aware of the problems at 
hand.  The TRA made U.S assistance inevitable and was reiterated by government 
officials.  The possibility of American support allowed officials to make bellicose 
statements.  U.S. capabilities would contain and counteract Beijing’s actions.  Lee’s 
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 supporters were elated with the arrival of the aircraft carrier Independence. Many 
citizens proclaim the carrier, ironically named Independence, was a “sign” of the island’s 
upcoming independence.   
Taipei’s Ministry of National Defense came to Lee’s defense.  This was a 
tremendous opportunity for the military.  It was also an opportunity to boost military 
spending and weapon modernization.  The United States under the TRA had provided 
arms sales since 1979, but with Beijing’s threats the need for self defense increased.  
Military officials pressed the government to implement a missile defense system, which 
could be purchased through the United States.  Military leaders simply believed a PLA 
attack could be neutralized and made statements directed at the PRC.  
Another shock was to the stock market.  It plummeted prior to each PLA 
exercise.  During the crisis foreign exchange reserves dropped $300 to $500 million a 
day.87 To send a signal to Beijing about the mutual threat to prosperity, Taiwan's Cal-
Comp Electronics announced it suspended plans for a $20 million plant to manufacture 
computer monitors in China and would shift production if the risk of confrontation with 
the mainland continued.88 
Taiwan’s presidential election did encounter setbacks.  President Lee 
remained president, but his support dropped considerably.  Officials claimed it was a 
victory over China. Voters overwhelmingly favored maintaining the status quo.  Citizens 
were not ready for war.  The campaigners for independence did especially poor.  It 
appeared Beijing intimidation had an effect on the population.  It could claim a small 
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IV. ARMS AND REUNIFICATION 
A. THE U.S. FACTOR 
1. Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) 
Although the United States recognized the People's Republic of China as the sole 
legal Government of China, Beijing remained suspicious, especially with the White 
House remaining “neutral on the questions of whether there should be reunification.”89  
Two months later, Beijing was blindsided when President Carter signed into law the 
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA).   The act sought to preserve and promote extensive 
relations between the United States and Taiwan through economic, political, and military 
support, essentially restoring de facto diplomatic relations.   
The TRA specifies that any effort to determine the future of Taiwan through other 
than peaceful means was of “grave concern” to the United States.  It mandated continued 
efforts to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character and stated that the United 
States would “resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion” directed at Taiwan.  
Section 3, considered the “security clause,” stipulates that “the United States will make 
available to Taiwan defense articles and services necessary for sufficient self-defense” 
and that the President and Congress shall determine the nature and quantity required 
defense based on the needs of Taiwan.  
The TRA provisions were called into question during the Reagan Administration, 
when a 17 Aug 1982 joint communiqué promised Beijing that Washington would reduce 
arms sales to Taiwan “qualitatively and quantitatively” over time, leading to their 
eventual termination, provided that Beijing’s approach to a resolution of the Taiwan 
question were peaceful.  
                                                 
89 U.S. House of Congress, Taiwan Legislation: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs.  
96th Congress, 1st Session, 7-8 Feb 1979 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1979): 39. 
 36
Through the 1980s and 1990s, despite the August 1982 communiqué, Washington 
continued to sell large quantities of arms to Taiwan.  At times, they included systems of 
higher quality—such as the sale in 1992 of 150 F-16s.  
In the late 1990s, to guarantee future China policies did not neglect Taiwan, 
Congress introduced the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (TSEA).   Though never 
adopted, the bill was Congress’ method to force a recommitment to Section 3 of the 
TRA.  The bill’s backers in Congress wanted a safe Taiwan with China understanding 
America’s intent in the Straits.  When President George W. Bush entered the White 
House, he voiced strong support for the TRA and pledged to continue the substantial 
sales of defense articles and services to Taiwan.90  The stage was set for a potential arms 
race by two governments separated by less than 100 miles.    
2. Arm Sales to Taiwan 
Since switching diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in 1979, the United 
States has consistently provided Taiwan with military weaponry and equipment.  
Washington justifies these sales under the Taiwan Relations Act.91  As previously 
discussed, the TRA specifies that the United States will “provide Taiwan with arms of a 
defensive character necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense 
capability.”  
Beijing contends arm sales infringe on China's sovereignty and contradict the 
August 1982 joint communiqué.  Although President Reagan pledged to reduce the sale 
of arms, Washington has refused to stop defense support to Taiwan.  As strong supporters 
of Taiwan, the United States willingness to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan is conditioned 
in the TRA upon Beijing’s commitment to a peaceful solution.92   
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The current Bush Administration has assumed a balanced policy toward the 
Taiwan Strait.  It has opposed Beijing’s threat of force against Taiwan through offers of 
arms sales and at the same time consistently opposed provocative policies by Taiwan that 
threaten the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.93  To guarantee 
U.S. interests abroad, Washington’s ambiguity maintains a balance between Beijing and 
Taipei. 
Arms sales remain a highly contested topic between Beijing, Taipei, and 
Washington.  Nevertheless, arms sales between the United States and Taiwan continue.  
The value of U.S. government and private industry arms agreements with Taiwan varies.  
Reports range from a low of $135 million in fiscal year 2000 to a high of nearly $6.3 
billion in fiscal year 1993.94  The following table provides information on U.S. sales of 
major defense articles and services to Taiwan, as approved by the President, proposed in 
Letters of Offer and Acceptance, and formally notified to Congress since 1990.95  
Defense articles listed were compiled based on unclassified notifications to Congress, 
announcements by the Administration as well as news and press reports.96  Additional 
sales of classified equipment have occurred, yet specifics cannot be acquired due to the 






Major item or service as proposed 





09/06  (1) C-130H transport aircraft 45
1991 
01/07 (100) MK-46 torpedoes  28
07/24 (97) SM-1 Standard air defense missiles  55
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09/13 (110) M60A3 tanks  119
1992 
05/27 Weapons, ammunition, support for 3 leased ships 212
08/04 (207) SM-1 Standard air defense missiles 126
09/14 (150) F-16A/B fighters; (3) Patriot-derived Modified Air 
Defense System (MADS) fire units  
7100
09/18 (12) SH-2F LAMPS anti-submarine helicopters  161
1993 
06/17 (12) C-130H transport aircraft  620
07/29 (38) Harpoon anti-ship missiles 68
11/04 (150) MK-46 Mod 5 torpedoes  54
11/23 MK-41 Mod (short) Vertical Launch Systems for ship based 
air defense missiles 
103
1994 
08/01 (80) AN/ALQ-184 electronic counter measure (ECM) pods 150
09/12 MK-45 Mod 2 gun system 21
1995 




05/23 (465) Stinger missiles; (55) dual-mounted Stinger launcher 
systems 
84
06/24 (300) M60A3TTS tanks 223
08/23 (1,299) Stinger surface-to-air missiles; (74) Avenger vehicle 
mounted guided missile launchers; (96) High-Mobility 
Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle 
420
09/05 (110) MK-46 MOD 5 anti-submarine torpedoes 66
1997 
02/14 (54) Harpoon anti-ship missiles 95
05/23 (1,786) TOW 2A anti-armor guided missiles; (114) TOW 
launchers; (100) High-Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled 
Vehicle 
81
07/24 (21) AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters 479
09/03 (13) OH-58D Kiowa Warrior Armed Scout helicopters 172
1998 
01/28 (3) Knox-class frigates; (1) MK 15 Phalanx Close-In 
Weapons System (CIWS) 
300
06/01 (28) Pathfinder/Sharpshooter navigation and targeting pods 160
08/27 (58) Harpoon anti-ship missiles; (61) Dual-mount Stinger 
surface-to-air missiles; (131) MK 46 Mod 5(A)S anti-
submarine torpedoes 
350
10/09 (9) CH-47SD Chinook helicopters 486
1999 
05/26 (240) AGM-114KS Hellfire II air-to-surface missiles 23
 39
07/30 (2) E-2T Hawkeye 2000E airborne early warning aircraft 400
2000 
03/02 TPS-75V air defense radar; (162) HAWK Intercept guided 
air defense missiles 
202
06/07 (39) Pathfinder/Sharpshooter navigation and targeting pods 234
09/28 (146) M109A5 howitzers, (200) AIM-120C Advanced 
Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM); (71) 
RGM-84L Harpoon anti-ship missiles 
795
2001 
07/18 (50) Joint Tactical Information Distribution Systems (JTIDS) 
terminals for data links between aircraft, ships, and ground   
725
09/05 (40) AGM-65G Maverick air-to-ground missiles 18
10/26 (40) Javelin anti-tank missile systems 51
2002 
06/04 (3) AN/MPN-14 air traffic control radars 108
09/04 (54) AAV7A1 assault amphibious vehicles; (182) AIM-9M-
1/2 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles; (449) AGM-114M3 
Hellfire II anti-armor missiles  
346
10/11 (290) TOW-2B anti-tank missiles 18
11/21 (4) Kidd-class destroyers 875
2003 
09/24 Multi-functional Information Distribution Systems 775
2004 
03/30 (2) Ultra High Frequency Long Range Early Warning Radars 1776
2005 




02/28 (218) AMRAAM; (235) Maverick air-to-ground missiles 421
08/08 (60) AGM-84L Harpoon Block II anti-ship missiles 125
09/12 (144) SM-2 Block IIIA Standard air-defense missiles; (12) 
P-3C maritime patrol/ASW aircraft 
2132
11/09 Patriot configuration 2 ground systems upgrade 
 
939
Table 1.   Major U.S. Arms Sales as Notified to Congress 97 
China’s rapid military modernization poses Washington with a challenge.  The 
United States has responded with arms sales to Taiwan and naval presence, yet such 
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policies carry an unintended cost, especially given trends in Taiwan politics.98  
Washington must ensure Beijing and Taipei understand U.S. defense policies fully 
support peaceful negotiations and deter independence movements.  By balancing threats 
and assurances as part of its deterrence policy, Washington helps enhance Taiwan’s 
security and avoids an unnecessary and avoidable great power conflict in the Asia-
Pacific.99 
B. TAIWAN’S PERCEPTION 
In 1979 the United States established relations with the People’s Republic of 
China, broke its diplomatic relations and ended the security treaty with Taipei, and 
agreed to maintain unofficial relations with Taiwan.100  Beijing believed that relations 
with Washington would bring resolution to the Taiwan issue; the outcome, however, has 
been drastically different.  To the dismay of Beijing, the United States passed the Taiwan 
Relations Act (TRA) preserving relations with Taiwan and, it guaranteed military arms 
sales and defensive support.  The TRA seemingly encouraged Taipei to resist unification. 
After losing the civil war on the mainland in 1949, Taipei maintained a “one 
China principle” like Beijing’s until the early 1990s.  Taipei’s position shifted with the 
election of Lee Teng-hui.  Lee held that “there is only one China,” but for the first time 
he introduced the notion of “one China, two equal political entities.”101  Taiwan’s two-
state theory suggested that “there may be one China again some day, but in the meantime 
the two sides should deal with each other as separate and equal states.”102  In order for 
reunification to occur, Beijing must accept Taiwan as a separate political entity.  Beijing 
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must acknowledge Taiwan as an equivalent political entity; it must accommodate 
Taipei’s role in the international community; and renounce the use of force.103   
In 1995 President Lee’s reaffirmed his position in a speech at Cornell University.  
President Clinton’s approval of Lee’s visa appeared to increase Taipei’s leverage towards 
an independence movement.  Lee's reelection in 1996 and the subsequent election of 
Chen Shui-bian in 2000, coupled with U.S. backing, has led to Taiwan's continued 
defiance of China.  
The possibility of reunification was particularly jeopardized in 2000 with Chen 
Shui-bian’s election to President.  As leader of the opposition Democratic Progressive 
Party, Chen’s repeated steps toward independence fanned the flames and gained 
Taiwan’s movement a high international profile.104  His administration could tip the 
balance from peaceful to non-peaceful means by seeking independence.  This was further 
emphasized in February 2006, when it was announced the National Unification Council 
would be abolished in hopes of raising the Taiwanese consciousness and reenergizing the 
party faithful into an independence resolution.105  During a televised speech Chen 
indicated the need for a new constitution as Taiwan and China are two different 
countries.  The Bush Administration quickly urged Chen to fully recognize the danger of 
his actions, yet the damage was done.  Chen’s statement and activities were a blatant 
disregard, provoking Beijing.   
In the meantime, the Bush Administration’s agreement to sell new packages of 
arms to Taiwan stalled in Taiwan’s parliament.  It appeared that many Taiwanese 
political and military leaders incorrectly believed that the island did not need to acquire 
defensive capabilities and could rely on the United States entirely.106  From Taipei, the 
view has been that the United States inhibits Chinese aggression, therefore allowing 
Taiwan’s democracy to prosper, promotes its economy, while remaining separate from 
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the mainland.  This point can be validated by the “six assurances,” conveyed to Taiwan in 
a letter from President Reagan in July 1982.  The U.S. position of continued military 
support and perpetual sale of strategic defense arms has thus seemed to mislead Taiwan 
into pushing for state independence and undermine China’s claim to sovereignty.   
C.   THE TAIWAN – CHINA – UNITED STATES BALANCE 
1. Near Term 
Taiwan remains a potential source of conflict between China and the United 
States, and a near term solution seems uncertain.  All parties must avoid giving the wrong 
impression leading to mistrust and conflict.  In the near term, it appears that Beijing will 
not use force to reunify, nor will Taipei gain independence.  The Chen Administration is 
unlikely to allow unification, but with U.S. pressure it will not press independence.  The 
process, in which the resolution is obtained, peacefully and amicably, determines the 
future of Taiwan – China – United States relations.  
As a near term resolution seems impossible, Beijing, Taipei, and Washington each 
have a crucial role in promoting peace and stability.  Beijing’s military modernization 
will continue, but it must soften its stance toward Taiwan and make China more attractive 
to Taiwanese citizens.107  The more successful mainland China’s leaders are in 
modernizing, in ways familiar to Taiwan, the more inclined Taiwan’s people will be to 
improve their society and participate in reunification.108  Yet these are long term 
processes.  The further development of travel, trade, and direct investments promote ties 
between citizens on both sides of the strait.  Beijing cannot continue to intimidate the 
people of Taiwan without an opposite outcome occurring.  The near term must be 
dedicated to removing the longstanding mistrust is critical in fostering improved 
relations.   
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Taipei cannot eliminate the possibility of reunification and must be willing to 
expand talks between the two sides.  Taiwan’s upcoming election could change the 
outlook on unification, but that is improbable.  In the near term greater steps in allowing 
mainland investment and products to enter the island can ease tensions.  The strict 
limitations on Chinese goods entering Taiwan aggravate Beijing.  Taipei’s independence 
rhetoric creates friction.  Its dependence on U.S. security generates fear in Beijing that 
the United States is actually supporting the succession of Taiwan.  While Taiwan 
continues to procure defense arms, China’s military modernizes opposite Taiwan.   
Washington must continue to pursue its longstanding default approach of dual 
deterrence: warning Taipei against taking provocative political initiatives and Beijing 
against using force, while reassuring each that Washington was not acting contrary to 
fundamental interests.109  The United States must assist in keeping peace within the 
region; either through diplomatic or economic means.  
The administrations must re-open talks to better political, economic, and social 
ties.  As major trading partners, any act leading to war is costly to the regional and global 
economy.  With trade and investment opportunities drawing the two sides closer, 
maintaining the status quo seems obvious and trouble free.  
2. Long Term 
Long term relations are dependent on the actions of Taipei, Beijing, and 
Washington and must be carefully managed.  The opening of dialogue would initially 
ease cross strait tension, however, any dialogue would be fruitless unless each side was 
willing to take steps that increased cooperation and diminished confrontation.110  Conflict 
would shock the economies of China and Taiwan, significantly affecting local and 
international supply chains.  The status quo may be acceptable in the short term, but in 
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the long term it is highly unlikely that Beijing can be persuaded to alter its calculus 
regarding Taiwan, especially not by a U.S. government that appears to be contradicting 
the status quo by supporting Taiwan.111  
Long term relations must be closely monitored as Beijing could simply lose 
patience with Taiwan’s recalcitrance and decide that it had no choice but to achieve 
unification.112  As China’s military modernization progresses, its capabilities could 
quickly overwhelm Taiwan giving Beijing more incentive to use force.   China’s military 
capabilities must be utilized as a deterrent; otherwise Taiwan’s resistance will grow 
stronger.   
Taipei must not trigger conflict through rash acts.  President Chen’s previous 
statements of independence and constitution reform fanned the flames.  Not all politicians 
agree with Chen and with the upcoming elections the newly appointed president could be 
key to reunification.  Taiwan depends upon the United States to challenge and contain 
China, yet this may be counterproductive.  The perpetual purchase of military equipment 
and reliance on the United States generates concern in Beijing as it appears inclined to 
succeed.  The removal of U.S. dependency may promote stronger cross strait interaction.  
Washington must step lightly, ensuring Beijing does not miscalculate its 
intentions.  It cannot allow Beijing to intimidate Taiwan or Taipei to provoke China.  
Remaining committed the policy of dual deterrence and maintaining the status quo is 
essential.  The difficulty is, as the Bush Administration has recognized, such efforts are 
likely to be more successful if greater levels of trust can be created through the 
establishment of a stronger, more cooperative, Sino-American relationship.113  The 
United States remains a factor not through equipment sales, but diplomacy and 
mediation.  The cost of conflict between the three would jeopardize the international 
economy and ensure tensions remain for years to come.   
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The current intermixing of cross-Strait businesses may lead to intensified talks as 
the economy is a driving factor.  Influential businessmen and technocrats who view the 
economic future of China and Taiwan interdependent may pressure for open negotiations.  
Steady progress in the development of cross strait cooperation will lessen mistrust and 
improve prospects for eventual agreement on a special political relationship between 
Taiwan and China, one closer than most sovereign states.114  Even in this cross-Strait 
contest, the odds are not bad for those who are willing to gamble that economic 
considerations will prevail and ultimately produce a lasting solution across the Taiwan 
Strait.115  As history shows, the fostering of closer ties between Beijing and Taipei is a 
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V. A PAPER TIGER? 
A. WHY MODERNIZE THE MILITARY? 
Deng's ascent to power began the start in earnest of political, economic, social, 
and cultural reforms – a turning point in modern Chinese political history.116  The 
impetus was to revive and build a substantial economy and participate in international 
affairs.   The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted its last major offensive in 1979 
in a border war against the Vietnamese, and, after 1985, with no perceived enemy this 
seemed quite logical, push economics with modernizing the military over time.  
Exhausting large sums of money into an under-utilized and over-populated force would 
take significant resources, be extremely expensive, and remove funds from the 
construction of the nation’s focus – industry and economics.  While satisfied with the 
delay of military modernization, Beijing was forced to refocus on reforming the military.   
China’s military modernization must occur for two reasons.  First, U.S. arm sales 
to Taiwan pose a significant threat and undermine Beijing’s claim to sovereignty over 
Taiwan. Should force against Taiwan be necessary, Beijing must have a military able to 
overwhelm Taiwan’s defense forces and deter the United States from intervention.   
Second, a credible military guarantees self defense and ensures the protection of national 
interests (addressed in Section E “Beyond Taiwan”).   
The sale of military arms and equipment to Taiwan remains a very sensitive 
subject for China.  From Beijing’s perspective, the cross-Strait question involves the 
United States.  Since the establishment of “unofficial” relations with Taiwan, the United 
States has provided the island with military defense capabilities, essentially supporting 
Taipei’s sovereignty.  Continued sales and Taiwan’s proposed independence referenda 




advance its military is developed by reviewing U.S.-led conflicts, namely the 1991 Gulf 
War, intervention in the Taiwan Strait Crisis, and the current wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  
The opening days of the Gulf War convinced PLA leaders that they were 
witnessing a revolution in military affairs.117  China’s High Command was stunned to 
realize just how far behind modern militaries the People’s Liberation Army had fallen. 
Beijing recognized surgical strikes combined with well-equipped soldiers easily knocked 
out Iraq’s defense capabilities and demolished Iraqi forces.  The magnificent 
demonstration of firepower intercepted and eliminated Chinese supplied weaponry.   
The 1995-96 Strait crisis transformed PLA thoughts on advanced reforms.  The 
missile testing derived that the United States would respond should Beijing use force 
against Taiwan.  Taipei’s arrogance was based on its reliance on the United States.  PRC 
leadership determined that China’s military power needed to be perceived as credible to 
prevent further steps toward Taiwan independence and U.S. interference.118   
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have provided the PLA with applicable lessons 
for developing a capable military.  The equipment provided to Taiwan was of superior 
quality and could inflict significant loses on the PLA should conflict occur.  U.S. missiles 
landed with precision, quickly disintegrating and demoralizing the army and making it 
impossible to fight.119  The Afghan insurgency re-taught the old lesson that if China 
decided to resort to force in solving the Taiwan issue, a superior military force that is 
willing to endure casualties, may not be defeated militarily by an inferior force, but its 
strategic objectives may be thwarted.120   
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There is no question that Beijing gives full emphasis to its ability to cope with the 
military forces of Taiwan and to deter, discourage, and intimidate the government and 
populace.121 The focus of military modernization remains Taiwan, but with U.S. military 
support Beijing must intimidate the island through its superior military capabilities.  The 
PLA’s military strategy must be to build up its strength sufficiently to be able: to 
dominate Taiwan psychologically; to increase its capacity so that it can successfully carry 
out an invasion of Taiwan; or to make the island’s successful defense against an invasion 
so unlikely that the Taipei government would be willing to concede.122  Strategically, it 
must also make sufficient military advancement to overrun Taiwan rapidly; to deter 
Taiwan and the United States by raising the costs of intervention; and to deny Taiwan 
and U.S. forces access to the theater of operations.123  
While Beijing denounces the sale of arms to Taiwan as a violation of its 
sovereignty, it must develop strategies to counteract and discourage future sales.124  If 
Taiwan independence seems probable to China's leaders, more investments will have to 
be made in infrastructure opposite Taiwan and in forces appropriate to conquer an island 
that may be defended by the United States.125  
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B. MILITARY CAPABLITY 
As the 1990’s came to a close, Beijing realized that conflict with Taiwan would 
draw in the United States.  Courtesy of the Taiwan Relations Act, U.S. arm sales enabled 
Taiwan to increase its self defense capability through substantial military purchases.  The 
PLA’s outdated equipment could not deter Taiwan from pressing forward with 
independence.  China needed new technology and weaponry.   
In August 1999, enlarged meeting of CCP's Political Bureau was held in 
Beidaihe.  Originally designed to focus on the economy, the focus switched to military 
advancement and the Taiwan issue.  The outcome was the “998 National Security System 
Project.”  Its main points include (1) to develop new strategic and tactical weapons; (2) to 
develop ship and submarine launched missiles and cruise missiles; (3) to equip the army, 
earlier than planned with electronic weapons, laser guns, and other directed energy 
weapons: (4) to terminate consultation with the United States on proliferation of 
weapons; (5) to partially revise the non-first-use nuclear policy; and (6) to revise the out-
sated position of non-alliance and non-grouping.126  Accelerating military modernization 
was necessary to ensure the Taiwan issue did not drag on indefinitely.127   
Beijing’s commitment to improving ground, naval, air and missile forces is 
essential to shifting the cross-Strait military balance in China’s favor.  With an average 
annual increase of 14.5 percent, maintaining defense expenditures at 2 percent of GDP 
will provide the defense establishment with sufficient funding to sustain its 
modernization programs.128  Though promoted as a purely defensive force, Beijing’s 
substantial funding of the armed forces attempts to realize the strategic goal of 
reunification and defending Chinese assets.  The military continues to improve its 
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 capabilities of countering various security threats, accomplishing diversified military 
tasks, and ensuring that it can effectively respond to crisis, deter, and win wars under 
complex circumstances.129   
1. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
Early PLA strategy was to develop the ground forces to defend an assault against 
the mainland. China’s national defense guarantees territorial integrity and for a 
prosperous society.  Future requirements for resources, the ever-lingering Taiwan issue, 
and witnessing conflict abroad shifted military thinking.  To effectively fulfill its mission 
in the new century, the PLA is speeding up the revolution in military affairs and 
enhancing its capabilities.130   
Advances in military technology and the modernization of the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) changed the nature of the threat to Taiwan’s security.131  PLA officials are 
placing emphasis on joint operations, long-distance mobility, “quick tempo” operations, 
and special operations, modeling their reforms on Russian doctrine and U.S. military 
tactics.132  The push is to conduct necessary downsizing to produce a smaller 
technologically advanced force capable of swift strikes leaving Taiwan defenseless and 
the United States discouraged.   
Acquisition and production of newer, sophisticated equipment validates the PLA 
as a lethal military.  In 2005, China had completed reductions from 1.4 million to 1.2 
million active troops.  The 200,000 troop decrease permitted additional funding for the 
development of new high-tech weaponry.  Since 2000, China’s defense industry has 
produced a variety of advanced equipment for PLA ground forces.  Additions to the 
arsenal include: Type 96, 98, and 99 battle tanks, ZBD 2000 amphibious tanks, armored 
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personnel carriers, Type 89 self-propelled artillery, and laser guided munitions.133  Of 
significance is that Chinese electronics and aviation industries have provided computers, 
satellite and microwave communications, optical fiber links, night-vision goggles, 
frequency-hopping radios, battlefield surveillance equipment, and unmanned aerial ve-
hicles.134  The artillery and air defense components have fielded new types of cannons, 
mobile anti-aircraft missiles, early warning radars, Z-10 attack helicopters, and increased 
the proportion of ground-to-air missiles.135 
With a vast coverage area, main battle tanks and field artillery are the most widely 
distributed of ground equipment.  Type 96, 98, and 99 account for over 1,200 tanks a 
force claiming 7,580 active tanks.136  Among the new capabilities acquired by PLA 
ground forces are the approximately 200 Type 98 and Type 99 main battle tanks now 
deployed to units near the coast.137  Field Artillery encompasses self propelled and towed 
batteries, missiles and guns, and rocket launchers.  The eastern seaboard contains an 
assortment of cruise missiles able to strike incoming targets.  The mobility enhances 
China’s ability to deter foreign threats and ensure territorial integrity.   
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Figure 1.   Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Ground Forces 138 
The PLA maintains an important role in deterring Taiwan with its potential to 
occupy the island physically by force.  Current figures have approximately 400,000 
troops and between 990 and 1,070 short-range ballistic missiles based the Nanjing 
Military Region opposite Taiwan.139  Consistent investments in medium range ballistic 
missiles, air to surface missiles (ASM), land attack cruise missiles (LACM), and anti-
radiation weapons enhance China’s deterrent of Taiwan independence.     
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Figure 2.   Major Ground Force Units 140  
 
Although Beijing professes a desire for peaceful resolution as its preferred 
outcome, the PLA’s ongoing deployment of short range missiles, enhanced amphibious 
warfare capabilities, and ground forces opposite Taiwan are reminders of Beijing’s 
unwillingness to renounce the use of force.141  As the United States remains supportive to 
Taiwan’s plight, the PLA will strengthen its military capabilities to counter any attempts 
of foreign interference. 
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2. People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA-N) 
Modernization of the PLA-Navy has made spectacular strides over the past 
decade.  The need for a stronger technically sound naval fleet is driven by Taiwan’s 
recent purchases of four U.S. KIDD Class destroyers and to maintain sea denial 
capability should the United States interfere in a resolution.  Naval forces are critical to 
the movement of troops, implementing a naval blockade, or mining harbors and straits.   
Naval leadership is adamant about gaining new technology, weapons, and modern 
platforms.  Although a majority of Chinese naval forces are acquired from Russia, 
China’s shipbuilding industry has developed modern facilities to increase productivity.  
Beijing is pursuing multiple paths to acquiring a modern navy; indigenous construction, 
reverse engineering of foreign ships, and outright purchase of foreign platforms.142  The 
funding placed into development of new units coupled with the refurbishment and 
updating older PLA-N units is astonishing.    
To counter Taiwan’s naval acquisitions and to deter the United States from 
entering into conflict on behalf of Taiwan, the PLA-N modernization program has 
focused on submarines, destroyers, and an aircraft carrier.   
The PLA-N submarine modernization program placed orders for twelve Russian 
KILO submarines, acquiring four in late 2006.  China’s defense industry began 
production of two diesel-electric attack submarines, SONG and YUAN class, and next 
generation nuclear submarines, SHANG and JIN class.  It is estimated that eight SONG 
class submarines are available to the fleet.  The YUAN class is heavily inspired by 
Russian designs, including rubber tile coatings, a super-quiet screw, and “air-independent 
propulsion,” which permit underwater operation for up to 30 days on battery power; 
making the vessel virtually inaudible.143  Both SHANG and JIN class nuclear submarines 
are expected to enter into the fleet in 2008.  The SHANG class nuclear attack submarine, 
Russian based, enables the PLA-N to launch land attack missiles for undisclosed 
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locations.  The JIN ballistic missile submarine, developed in the late 1990s, is capable of 
housing 12 long range missiles.  This gives Beijing the ability to target the United States 
should hostilities arise.  
Beijing emphasis on anti-surface and anti-air warfare is evident in recent 
purchases and production.  In 2007, the PLA-N accepted delivery of two Russian 
SOVREMENNY II destroyers, bringing the total to four; all equipped with surface-to-
surface and surface-to-air missiles (SAM).  Further, the PLA Navy has received seven 
new domestically produced surface combatants in the past two years, including two 
LUYANG II class Destroyers fitted with the indigenous long-range surface-to-air missile; 
two LUZHOU class Destroyers equipped with the Russian long-range SAM, and three 
JIANGKAI II class guided missile frigates to be fitted with the medium-range vertically 
launched SAM.144 
Though considered power projection, and against proclaimed “self defense,” 
PLA-N leadership expressed sincere interest in producing an aircraft carrier.  An aircraft 
carrier would facilitate Chinese air operations in the Taiwan Strait by reducing the need 
for sorties from land bases and enable power projection in and around Chinese 
territories.145  Over the past twenty years, China attained four conventional aircraft 
carriers; one from Australia, and three from Russia.  While none are operational, it is safe 
to assume that Chinese engineers have conducted numerous tests to gain insight to 
possible production.  Whether utilized for fighters or helicopters, its mission revolves 
around the PLA-N’s submarine centric warfare.   
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Figure 3.   Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Naval Forces 146  
 
The PLA-N is divided into three Fleets – North, East, and South Fleets.  While 
each is responsible for protecting the mainland, the East and South fleets are dedicated to 
actions against Taiwan if force is required.  In the case of Taiwan independence, the East 
and South Fleets work in unison to counter Taiwan’s Navy, restrict sea access to all 
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Figure 4.   Major Naval Units 147  
 
China today aims to deploy a modern navy capable of operating on, above, and 
below the sea’s surface to “become a Great Wall at Sea.”148  Beijing’s requirement for a 
powerful, technically superior navy remains directed toward Taiwan and the United 
States, but future interests may dictate a secondary role for the PLA-N.  As the Chinese 
Navy grows in military significance, one can only speculate about the degree to which 
government officials in various Asian countries privately take China’s armed might into 
account as they make policy on less publicized issues.149     
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3. People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLA-AF) 
To combat the advanced aircraft Taiwan purchased, the PLA-AF shifted its 
strategy from defensive to offensive. The shift from strictly defensive to offensive 
capabilities derived from the realization that precision guided missiles and long range 
cruise missiles had changed the rules of air warfare.150  The change allowed Beijing to 
gain air superiority by denying air access to Taiwan’s aircraft, and the United States 
should an aircraft carrier be deployed to the region.  
To advance its relatively backward air force, the PLA-AF began a series of 
aircraft and technology acquisitions from Russia. China agreed to purchase multi-role 
fighters, bombers, and attack helicopters to quickly develop the PLA-AF.  The $2.5 
billon contract allowed provided Beijing with 200 basic model Su-27s and the ability to 
begin local production of an advanced model, Su-27SK.151  Since 2000, the PLA-AF has 
reduced the number of combat aircraft, giving priority to the development of more 
advanced longer-range strike and ground-attack aircraft, improved early warning and air 
defenses, extended and close air support, and longer range transport, lift, and mid-air 
refueling capabilities.152  
Taiwan remains the focal point to modernization.  PLA Air Force officials are 
determined to ensure air supremacy thereby deterring Taiwan from succession.  For 
emphasis, China maintains roughly 700 combat aircraft located within range of Taiwan.  
While many aircraft are older, production of new, sophisticated models are increasing.  
The fabrication of the multi role Su-30MKK strike and F-10 fighter aircraft gives China a 
definite advantage over Taiwan.  Added to its strike aircraft are the introduction of the 
modernized FB-7A fighter bomber, the upgraded B-6 bomber, and indigenous Z-10 
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attack helicopter.153  Further improvements in early warning radar and missile accuracy 
reduce the chances of a surprise attack from Taiwan or incoming aircraft from the United 
States.   
 
Figure 5.   Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Air Forces 154   
 
Similar to the PLA, the PLA-AF is located in each Military Region with a 
majority of assets located across from Taiwan.  In the event of a Taiwan Crisis additional 
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Figure 6.   Major Air Forces Units 155  
 
The most immediately relevant driver of the PLA-AF’s modernization is to 
reassert control over Taiwan and protecting Chinese airspace from possible U.S. intrusion 
if conflict ensues.156  Chinese Air Forces concentrate primarily on maintain internal 
security, but the acquisition of precision guided munitions, in air refueling capability, and 
attack fighters is moving the PLA-AF from defensive to an offensive minded strategy.  
                                                 
155 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s 
Republic of China,” (2008): 53.  
156 Keith Crane and Roger Cliff, eds., Modernizing China’s Military: Opportunities and Constraints, 
Arlington, VA: RAND (2005): 17.  
 62
C. RESOLUTION OPTIONS 
Three options for reunification exist – peaceful, forceful, and maintaining the 
status quo.  While the international community desires a peaceful resolution, PLA 
officials want to flex their muscles in a non-peaceful, violent reunification.  China’s “one 
China” policy is crystal clear with any outcome other than reunification would 
contamination the PRC’s legitimacy. 
1. Peaceful 
Over the past decade, political developments in Taiwan have placed peaceful 
unification in question.  Accepting Taiwan’s national identity and gaining a significant 
degree of autonomy are necessary for authorities and citizens to agree on unification.  
Peaceful unification would most likely first require both the emergence of a consensus on 
a Taiwan national identity that is at once Chinese and Taiwanese and on the emergence 
of a stable, mature democracy on the mainland comparable to those in Taiwan, Japan, 
and South Korea today—otherwise, the people of Taiwan would have little confidence in 
any promises of autonomy that Beijing might extend.157  
The best chance for a peaceful resolution of Taiwan’s status probably lies in an 
arrangement somewhere between formal independence and formal unification, which 
both Taiwan and the mainland had equal standing, so called “peaceful in-
betweenness.”158  Should full reunification occur voluntary, and without coercion, the 
relationship between Taiwan, China, and the United States changes dramatically.    
Accepting a “one country, two system” policy would allow Taiwan to retain its military, 
but the requirement for U.S. military support is not longer required removing a long 
standing threat.  During the unification process tensions may arise between China and 
Taiwan, but the chances of future conflict decrease.  With a resolution, the need for PLA 
modernization lessens as the role of the military shifts primarily to territorial defense.        
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2. Forceful  
China has for a long time insisted that it would use force in two instances, namely 
the “independence of Taiwan” and “foreign intervention” in the Taiwan issue.159  China's 
main objective is to avoid the island's permanent loss as it could also establish a 
dangerous precedent for other potentially secession-minded areas of the country, such as 
Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia.160 
a. With U.S. Involvement 
In 2001, President Bush guaranteed military support for Taiwan.  
Although he quickly recanted, China understood America’s position – the use of force 
would not be acceptable.  Should Beijing decide on forceful means to obtain reunification 
the United States would intervene unless Taiwan authorities provoked Beijing.  With 
U.S. military support coupled with a technically sound Taiwanese military, the PLA 
could stumble.  As previously noted, the military capability of China has increased 
dramatically, yet remain unproven.  A PLA general responding to a question regarding 
U.S. intervention replied “that China has no capability to wage a conventional war 
against the United States and in the event of war China will have to respond with nuclear 
weapons.”161  While this statement may not mirror China’s leadership, the possibility 
remains should Beijing want Taiwan’s return that bad.   
The defeat of both the United States and Taiwan would be damaging for 
each.  China emerges as the regional hegemon and a major actor in world affairs.  
Washington’s international reputation is dealt a tremendous blow.  The United States 
would have no choice but to accept Taiwan’s reunification or as the beginning of another 
Cold War.   
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A defeated China may cede independence to Taiwan, but tensions would 
remain extremely high.  China may readdress political and economic relations while 
reviving dialogue focusing on peaceful reunification.  Conversely, Beijing may increase 
military modernization determined to overwhelm Taiwan and the United States in an 
attempt to reclaim the island.  
Taiwan's proximity to China, the difficulty involved in interdicting 
Chinese attacks without directly striking the Chinese mainland, and the historical 
inclination of both sides to display resolve in a crisis through decisive -- and sometimes 
rapid - military action suggest that escalation might prove extremely difficult to 
control.162 
b. Without U.S. Involvement 
Remaining absent in Taiwan’s defense seems unlikely, but plausible 
should Taiwan unnecessarily provoke China.  A preemptive strike against Taiwan 
thereby gaining total power is another option eliminating U.S. military intervention.  
Either option would be consider a major victory for Beijing.  Any hesitation or non-
intervention by the United States would be viewed as Washington realizing the superior 
power of Chinese forces and tarnishing American clout in the international community.  
The costs of war, whether short or prolonged, would be devastating for 
China and Taiwan’s political and economic sectors.  Although the situation dictates 
relations between Taipei, Beijing, and Washington the international community may not 
be forgiving.  An attack would provoke strong reaction in Japan and China’s neighbors in 
South and Southeast Asia, as it indicates Beijing will resort to force to settle future 
bilateral disputes or conflicts.163  
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Regardless of U.S. non-involvement the Taiwan issue has influenced 
China’s status.  Even if China claimed victory, its external environment will become 
more hostile and prove devastating.164  
3. Maintaining the Status Quo 
Although the international community desires any peaceful outcome, maintaining 
the status quo seems the obvious resolution to the Taiwan issue.  China would maintain a 
“one China” principle, extend peaceful unification, and intimidate through force.  Taiwan 
acknowledges a “one China” principle, threatens independence, and relies on the United 
States to provide arms and security.  The United States continues to maintain “strategic” 
ambiguity providing contradictory polices to each government.  Without a willingness of 
authorities in Beijing and Taipei to concede to a mutual solution, the Taiwan question 
will remain unresolved.   
Should Beijing indicate a willingness to consider a unification arrangement in 
which mainland China and Taiwan were equal partners, as opposed to the current “One 
Country, Two Systems” proposal—which stipulates that Taiwan would be a “special 
administrative region” under the mainland government—perceptions that Taiwan’s status 
could be resolved peacefully would probably increase, resulting in a concomitant 
decrease in military tensions.165  Neither government desires violent reunification 
especially with the possibility of U.S. involvement, yet mutual economic dependency 
coupled with PLA modernization could shift a resolution in Beijing’s favor.  Compassion 
for Taiwan compatriots has allowed Chinese leaders to compromise in reclaiming 
Taiwan. Beijing’s flexibility could promote unification, reduce cross-strait tensions, and 
increase solidarity. 
Should Taipei indicate a willingness to accept a “one China” principle and 
become a “special administrative region,” the volatility in the region diminishes 
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considerably.  In such a situation, although Taiwan would likely continue to be an 
important issue, it could become significantly less prominent than it is today, and other 
issues such as trade imbalances, human rights, or the situation on the Korean peninsula, 
might come to dominate the relationship.166  
With China and Taiwan becoming further interlaced the reluctance to modify 
unification policies cloud Taiwan’s future.  As Taiwan threatens independence, China 
threatens forceful unification, and the United States threatens intervention with neither 
acting to deteriorate maturing relations, Taiwan’s status remains undetermined.  
D. MILITARY OPTIONS 
China’s emergence as a global economic force, increased diplomatic clout, and 
improved air, naval, and missile forces strengthen Beijing’s position relative to Taipei by 
increasing the mainland’s economic leverage over Taiwan, fostering Taiwan’s diplomatic 
isolation, and shifting the cross-Strait military balance in the mainland’s favor.167  
Beijing has improved relations with Taipei, yet “the struggle to oppose and contain the 
separatist forces for Taiwan independence” remains central to China’s grand strategy.168  
Any independence referenda or statements insinuating succession have been met with 
staunch disapproval.  The promotion of peaceful unification continues with the use of 
force lingering over the head of Taiwan authorities.  Beijing’s advancement of the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) prevents independence and interference while allowing 
forceful, military options should Taipei resist.  
1. Maritime Blockade 
Cross-strait naval balance favors China.  The PLA-N could easily ensure sea 
control around Taiwan.  China claims a 14 to 1 advantage in submarines and 3 to 1 
advantage in principal combatants; with Taiwan maintaining a slight edge in coastal 
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patrol craft.169  Establishing a blockade of Taiwan essentially isolates the island from the 
international community. Port closures and the removal of foreign trade would devastate 
Taiwan’s economy forcing it to reconsider reunification.  
While a blockade is an act of war under international law, the great majority of 
nations do not disagree with China’s “one China” position and Beijing could claim that 
this was a “closure of ports,” within its sovereign rights.170  Beijing could declare that all 
commercial traffic en route to Taiwan must stop in mainland ports for inspection prior to 
transiting to Taiwan.171  
The positioning of PLA-N assets in critical sea lanes of communication would 
create chaos for incoming merchant traffic and occupy the Taiwan Navy.  PLA-N 
activities ranging from small weapon firing to missile launches could obstruct shipping 
lanes.  Naval operations around the island may provoke Taiwan triggering Beijing’s 
deployment of short range missiles and air assets.   
The use of PLA-N vessels to mine harbors and waters surrounding Taiwan is 
another tactic available to Beijing.  China’s large inventory of sea mines, and Taiwan’s 
poor MCM capabilities, a mine blockade is a potentially serious threat to Taiwan.172  
With only 12 assets available for mine clearing operations, Taiwan must gain U.S. 
assistance.  With only two Mine Countermeasure (MCM) ships based in Japan and the 
remaining located in Texas, Taiwan’s ports would be secured for a considerable time.  
Vital resources inbound to Taiwan would be forced to obtain military assistance to clear 
hazardous channels.  One commercial vessel striking a mine would impact all merchant 
traffic whether inbound or outbound.  Transport companies would be unwilling to 
provide shipping into potentially deadly waters.   
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Implementing a blockade of Taiwan’s major ports limits trade flexibility and 
drastically weakens the local economy.  The PLA-N’s ability to further delay U.S. 
intervention leads Taiwan into disarray forcing authorities to negotiate on Beijing’s 
terms.   
 
Figure 7.   Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Blockade Forces 173   
 
2. Amphibious Assault 
Although the United States has provided Taiwan with advanced technology, 
weapons, and equipment, military balance across the strait has shifted toward China.  The 
previous option, Maritime Blockade, confronts Taiwan’s weakness – foreign trade 
dependency.  An amphibious assault is a direct challenge to the leadership, military, and 
citizens of Taiwan.  
The seas, weather, and landing locations pose additional problems to the 
movement of amphibious forces.  Suitable landing beaches on Taiwan are scarce; much 
of the western coastline is protected by extensive, shallow mud flats that severely 
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complicate getting amphibious ships close enough to put troops and equipment ashore, 
but also permit defending forces to concentrate on locations an invasion force could 
conceivably occupy.174  
While China has the manpower to successfully stage an amphibious operation, it 
lacks sufficient amphibious ships.  Although the PLA-N is constructing advanced landing 
ships, the amphibious fleet could provide sealift sufficient to transport approximately one 
infantry division.175  Analysts predict the use of the merchant fleet to assist in 
transporting a fully supplied armored division across the straits.  The utilization of 
supplementary vessels requires considerable planning, but insufficient training may 
hamper cross-strait landings.    
Nevertheless, should Beijing insist on an amphibious assault, joint operations 
between all service branches are required for success.  Combat operations, conducted by 
PLA air, naval, and missile forces, aim to destroy the enemy’s defense system, consume 
the enemy’s fighting strength, clear obstacles from the landing area, and isolate, 
blockade, or interdict the landing area in order to create favorable conditions for the 
landing force.176  Gaining air superiority followed by sea superiority permit troop 
movement with little resistance.  Upon landing, the insertion of armored assets, tanks, 
and mechanized weaponry allow army and marine brigades to occupy ports and harbors 
necessary for additional transport.  As troop number grow, PLA unit press forward to 
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With substantial planning, funding, and risk involved in an amphibious assault, its 
intent is to compel Taipei to agree upon reunification through outright military defeat or, 
more likely, from a decision by Taiwan authorities that the cost of resistance (with or 
without U.S. assistance) outweighs the benefits of continued independence.177  
 
 
Figure 8.   Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Amphibious Assault Forces 178   
 
3. Strategic Strike 
Over the past decade, Chinese missile development is driven by the Taiwan issue 
and deterrence of the United States.  A strategic missile strike is a credible option 
available to Beijing.  Strategic strike refers to the application of missiles against specific 
targets vital to the enemy.  Attacks on the enemy’s center of gravity provide 
psychological damage through a shock effect.  An advanced missile force is expected to 
provide the Beijing appreciable military advantage for which Taiwan has no effective 
response or defense; without such capabilities Taipei may seek separation.179  
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The Second Artillery use of offensive missile systems is crucial to success.  
Second Artillery forces must concentrate long and short range firepower against the most 
critical, threatening, and vulnerable enemy targets in order to paralyze its combat systems 
and set Beijing’s conditions for reunification.180  Sustained attacks in and around Taiwan 
reduce commercial shipping and foreign trade devastating the economy.  Although 
Taiwan has acquired missile defense systems, the short time required for PLA missiles to 
reach the island allows for few missiles to be neutralized.  The deployment of over 900 
short-range ballistic missiles to regions opposite Taiwan makes a profound statement; de 
jure independence will not be tolerated.   
PLA planners must stop short of all out war by striking military bases and defense 
systems.  Targeting industries, harbors, and the population would be costly to Beijing and 
may reverse the intended effects.  Precise missile strikes on Taiwan’s vulnerabilities 
increase Taipei pleas for reconciliation.   
 
 
Figure 9.   China’s Missile Forces 181   
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E. BEYOND TAIWAN 
U.S. arms sales coupled with achieving a resolution to the Taiwan issue propel 
China’s military modernization.  Should a peaceful resolution occur, Beijing’s military 
focus may shift to its secondary concern – the protection of vital resources and sea lines 
of communication.  Not to say neighboring areas are overlooked, but special attention has 
been paid to Taiwan and the United States. 
China’s air, naval, and missile capabilities deter opposition to claimed islands and 
territorial waters and access denial in the East and South China Seas.  In November 2004, 
a Chinese Han-class submarine was detected near the Senkaku Islands; an island chain 
claimed by both Japan and China.  The disputed islands generate tension; especially with 
the indication of large amounts of natural resources within the area.  With emphasis on 
securing strategic resources, gaining control of the Senkaku islands would provide 
legitimacy over the Pinghu Oil Field.  The Spratly Islands remain a source of contention 
within the Asian-Pacific region.  Multiple disputes have occurred as each nation is vying 
for precious natural resources which the island chain is thought to contain. To add fuel to 
the fire, this area is the largest shipping lanes to Asia; especially oil from the Middle East.   
Beijing also seeks to extend its diplomatic influence into Latin America, the 
Middle East, and Africa with the intension to ensure China’s access to energy supplies.182  
In Latin America and the Middle East military technology and hardware are exchanged 
for energy rights and shipping lanes.  Ground forces are the forward deployed to 
operations in Africa allowing the safeguard of additional resources.  In some cases, the 
People’s Republic of China offers military support to safeguard their energy supply.  
With its growing dependency on energy supplies, Beijing inadvertently or purposely 
“locks up” resources to guarantee their supply while denying access to others nations.   
                                                 
182 Paul H.B Godwin, “China as a Major Power: The Implications of its Military Modernization,” 
Andrew Scobell ed., Shaping China’s Security Environment: The Role of the People’s Liberation Army.  
Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College (2006): 107.  
 73
China’s Defense White Papers profess national defense and peaceful 
development, however, the acquisition and production of advanced weapons, equipment, 
 and technology tell a different story.  The PLA is molding into a force capable of 
performing a variety of military functions not only against Taiwan, but in the Asia-
Pacific region and beyond.  Although China’s military modernization amplifies anxiety in 
its neighbors, it provides Beijing the option to utilize coercion to obtain an advantage in 
capital, natural resources, and resolving territorial disputes.   
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VI. CONCLUSION 
U.S. arms sales and military support to Taiwan create two significant problems.  
One, Taiwan authorities rely heavily on the United States, thereby, remaining defiant 
regarding talks concerning reunification; and two, the lingering uncertainty regarding a 
Taiwan resolution compels China to accelerate its military modernization. 
Although limited progress has occurred over the past two decades, yet Taiwan 
remains a source of conflict between China, Taiwan, and the United States.  Washington 
acknowledges the PRC as the sole legal government of China, with Taiwan as part of 
China; however, its continuing support makes reunification uncertain from Beijing’s 
perspective. 
All parties must avoid giving the wrong impression that might lead to mistrust 
and conflict.  In the near term, it appears Beijing will not use force to reunify, nor will 
Taipei gain independence.  While the Chen Administration rejects unification and 
continues to procure defense arms, China’s military modernizes opposite Taiwan.   
The sale of military arms and equipment to Taiwan remains a very sensitive 
subject for China.  Beijing denounces the U.S. sale of arms to Taiwan as a violation of its 
sovereignty, and it must develop strategies to counteract and discourage future sales.183  
The question of whether China can afford to attack Taiwan is misguided, for the threat of 
force against Taiwan is a deterrent to Taiwan’s independence; but should deterrence fail, 
Beijing would feel it had no choice but to launch an overall attack on Taiwan.184 
Taiwan’s presidential election in March 2008 could change the outlook on 
unification, but that is improbable.  Taiwan authorities remain dependent upon the United 
States to constrain China.  The removal of Taipei’s dependency on Washington may 
promote stronger cross strait interaction. Washington must step lightly to ensure Beijing 
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does not miscalculate its intentions.  The U.S. pledge to Taiwan still troubles China.  The 
continued sale of military arms granted through the Taiwan Relations Act and the “six 
assurances” to Taiwan believed to undermine China’s authority.  Beijing has long 
opposed arms sales and believes that U.S. support provokes and misleads Taiwan into 
pushing for independence.  A reduction or ending of arms sales may significantly 
improve the prospects for an eventual resolution, though perhaps not on terms acceptable 
to Taipei.  If continued, it is highly unlikely the Chinese government can be persuaded or 
coerced to alter its calculus regarding Taiwan, especially not by a U.S. government that 
appears to be supporting Taiwan's independence.185  
The opening of dialogue would initially ease cross strait tension.  However, any 
dialogue would be fruitless unless each side were willing to take steps that increased 
cooperation and diminished confrontation.186  The administrations must re-open talks to 
better political, economic, and social ties.  As major trading partners, any act leading to 
war would be costly to the regional and global economy.  With travel, trade, and 
investment opportunities drawing the populations closer, maintaining the status quo is 
easier.  Although acceptable in the short term, in the long term it is highly unlikely that 
Beijing can be persuaded to alter its calculus regarding Taiwan, especially not by a U.S. 
government that appears to be contradicting the status quo by supporting Taiwan.187  
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